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Article 6  
Right to Liberty and Security 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. 
Text of Explanatory Note on Article 6 
The rights in Article 6 are the rights guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR, and in accordance 
with Article 52(3) of the Charter, they have the same meaning and scope. Consequently, the 
limitations which may legitimately be imposed on them may not exceed those permitted by 
the ECHC, in the wording of Article 5: 
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the 
lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
prescribed by law; 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of 
having committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary 
to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of 
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or 
vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, 
of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him. 
 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this 
article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending 
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and 
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
 
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions 
of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” 
The rights enshrined in Article 6 must be respected particularly when the European 
Parliament and the Council adopt legislative acts in the area of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, on the basis of Articles 82, 83 and 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, notably to define common minimum provisions as regards the 
categorisation of offences and punishments and certain aspects of procedural law. 
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A. Field of Application of Article 6 
Under Article 51 of the Charter, Article 6 is addressed to the institutions of the EU but binds 
the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. For a long period following 
its inception, neither the law of the European Union nor its institutions had much relevance to 
the issue of liberty of the person. The fields covered by EU law were remote from the 
exercise of sovereign power in policing, security and immigration. Even when some 
competence in these fields was acquired, the Union proceeded outside the legal mainstream 
under the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. After successively, the Amsterdam, Nice 
and Lisbon treaties however,  immigration, asylum and aspects of criminal justice have come 
to fall under both the ordinary legislative procedure and the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice. With the growing integration of these functions provided by the creation of the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice there are now significant fields where the scope of Union 
law extends to matters that potentially engage Article 6. The Union itself has a number of 
institutions, which, whilst not physically engaged in arrest or detention, nevertheless direct 
policies and actions that may lead to such measures, particularly in relation to cross-border 
crime and the execution of the European Arrest Warrant. These include Eurojust, European 
Police Office (Europol), European Judicial Network, the putative European Public Prosecutor 
and the External Borders Agency (Frontex).  
Most importantly, Member States also now act to arrest and detain persons pursuant to 
provisions of Union law, most obviously in the field of migration and asylum, but also during 
co-operation in criminal proceedings. The facilitation of the return of persons to other 
Member States to serve terms of imprisonment or to face potential holding under immigration 
powers depends upon mutual respect for detention regulations and practices. Whilst 
initiatives relating to arrest and detention at Council of Europe level have been long-standing, 
the EU has itself increased policies to harmonize such standards as cross-border cooperation 
has proceeded. Following adoption by the Council of the EU of a ‘Roadmap’1 for 
strengthening the rights of suspects, the European Council’s Stockholm programme in justice 
and home affairs made this an important goal of policy.2 The Commission is also consulting 
on what further detention measures are needed to harmonise standards and facilitate prisoner 
returns.3 Finally, there has always been scope for the fundamental rights protection, now 
embodied in the Charter, to apply to migrant EU citizens and their family members who find 
themselves subject to detention in another Member State under the principle set out in 
Rutilli.
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 This principle should extend to long-term resident non-EU citizens, who are 
increasingly integrated with Union citizens pursuant to EU secondary-legislation. 
The specific instruments where Member States implement Union law pertinent to Article 6 
are increasingly numerous. In the criminal field, the most important measure is the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant5 authorises arrest and detention 
pending return of criminal suspects and those convicted of crimes to other Member States.  
Although not determined by the Court of Justice specifically in relation to detention yet, 
domestic proceedings regarding the European Arrest Warrant do engage the Charter.6 The 
Framework Decision on Mutual Recognition of Criminal Convictions requires that the 
Member State of residence take back and imprison those persons convicted and deprived of 
their liberty in other Member States.7 The Framework Decision on Supervision Orders8 
provides a mechanism for mutual recognition of alternatives to custodial orders made in 
respect of non-residents who are prosecuted or convicted in other Member States.  Pursuant 
to the Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspects, two Directives have been 
passed which create harmonised standards in relation to access to interpreting services and 
information for persons arrested pursuant to criminal proceedings and under the European 
Arrest Warrant.9 Finally, under the ne bis in idem provisions of the Schengen Implementing 
Convention (Articles 54-6), when a Member State proposes to sentence a defendant who has 
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 Council of the EU, Resolution on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused 
persons in criminal proceedings, OJ C 295/1, 4.12.2009. 
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8
 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application between Member States of 
the European Union, of the principle of mutal recognition too decisions on supervision as an alternative to 
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 Directive 2010/64 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right to interpretation and translation 
in criminal proceedings, OJ L 280, 26.10.2010; Directive 2012/13 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the right to information in criminal  proceedings, OJ L 142/1, 1.6.2012. A further Directive has been 
proposed on access to a lawyer for suspects and those subject to the EAW: COM (2011) 326(3) proposal for a 
Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and the right to communicate upon arrest.  
already been convicted for the same acts in another Member State, they must reduce the 
sentence to take account of time already served. 
In the field of migration there are also a great number of measures impinging up personal 
liberty. For Union citizens and their families of any nationality, the Citizens Directive10 
impliedly authorises detention pursuant to deportation or removal. In the field of asylum 
there are four measures pursuant to the Common European Asylum policy which bear upon 
personal liberty. The Asylum Reception Conditions Directive11 partially regulates freedom of 
movement and detention during the asylum procedure. The Dublin II Regulation 12 
determines the criteria for returning asylum seekers to other Member States to consider their 
asylum claims and indirectly bears upon their rights pending such return.  The Refugee Status 
Directive13  determines aspects of the recognition process for asylum seekers and therefore 
impinges on their potential liability to detention during the procedure. This Directive also 
grants a right of free movement to those recognized as refugees or given subsidiary 
protection. Finally, the Asylum Procedures Directive governs appeal rights in refugee status 
determination but also mentions detention.14  The asylum measures have been the subject of 
negotiation to amend them and important new provisions on detention have been inserted into 
the final drafts of the new Directive on Reception Conditions and the Dublin II Regulation.15 
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304, p. 12, and corrigendum, OJ 2005 L 204, p. 24); 
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 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States 
for granting and withdrawing refugee status (OJ 2005 L 326, p. 13, and corrigendum, OJ 2006 L 236, p. 36). 
15
 Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a Directive of  the European Parliament 
and of the Council laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), 
2008/0244 (COD), 14 December 2012.  Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a 
Regulation of  the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), 2008/0243 (COD), 14 
December 2012. The Procedure Directive is also being renegotiated but the proposals in relation to detention are 
limited to cross-referencing the grounds of detention to those in the proposed Reception Conditions. See 
European Commission, Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection status, COM(2011) 319 final, 
1.6.2011,  Article 28. 
In relation to non-asylum migration measures, the most significant measure authorizing 
detention is that in relation to irregular migrants under the Returns Directive16 which creates 
a detailed legal code to ensure the removal of migrants in respect of whom a removal order 
has been made. There is also an implied power to use force in the Common Borders Code.17 
The Long-residents Directive confers powers of expulsion and/or withdrawal of residence 
permits on public policy grounds and therefore impliedly authorises detention.18  Similar 
considerations apply to the Family Reunification Directive19 which gives powers to expel 
third-country national family members.  
B. Interrelationship of Article 6 with other provisions of the Charter 
The most obvious general point of contacts between Article 6 and other parts of the Charter 
are in relation to Article 1, the obligation to respect and protect human dignity, and Article 4, 
the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This is 
because, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as explained 
below, the conditions of detention themselves affect the legality of detention. The distinction 
between a restriction on liberty and a deprivation of liberty has yet to be explored in Union 
law. There are Charter provisions which are pertinent to this issue. Specifically for Union 
citizens, Article 45(1) grants the right to move and reside freely within the Member States. 
This provision must however be read in light of the Treaty restrictions on the free movement 
rights of EU citizens which do permit exclusion or deportation in certain cases. Ancillary 
detention is permitted in such cases. For non-EU citizens, Article 45(2) says that freedom of 
movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the treaties, to such persons 
who are legally resident in a Member State. The Charter also acknowledges the right of 
asylum in Art 18 and this engages those aspects of refugee law which impinge upon 
detention.  The prohibition on collective expulsion of aliens in Art 19(1) means that detention 
cannot be used for this purpose.  The right of children to have their best interests made a 
primary consideration and to maintain contact with their parents, both of which are 
acknowledged in Art 24(2)(3), are relevant to detention practice.  
The common connection between arrest, detention and the rule of law, particularly in the 
context of criminal prosecutions, means that the Charter provisions under the ‘Justice’ 
Chapter are also particularly relevant. Article 47 requires that persons whose rights are 
violated must have an effective remedy and a fair hearing within a reasonable time. Article 
48 affirms the presumption of innocence for detainees who have been charged. Article 49 
requires that no one should be punished without law. Article 50 prohibits double jeopardy. In 
applying this prohibition, regard must be had to the more detailed ne bis in idem rules of the 
Schengen Implementing Convention (Articles 54-6) which require time served already to be 
taken into account. Detainees may seek to invoke any of these Charter provisions to 
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  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents (OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44)Articles 6, 12, 17 and 22 set out substantive and procedural 
protection against expulsion or deportation that mirrors some of the concepts found in relation to EU citizens. 
For a detailed analysis see S. Peers, ‘Implementing Equality? The Directive on Long Term Resident Third 
Country Nationals’, [2004] 29(4) ELRev, 437. 
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  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ 2003 L 
251, p. 1). 
challenge aspects of their prosecution and thereby, in an ancillary manner, their detention. 
However, in general terms, detention is not unlawful retrospectively simply because the 
prosecution or conviction which led to it is subsequently withdrawn or quashed. 
C. Sources of Article 6 Rights 
I. European Convention on Human Rights 
Art. 6 corresponds to Art. 5 ECHR and Art 52(3) Charter states that it must be read in a 
manner consistent with Art 5 ECHR. This means that only the specific justifications for 
detention listed are permitted under Article 6 not the broader public policy justifications 
implicit in Art 52 (see the explanations to the Charter). Art 3 - the prohibition on torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment also informs the regulation of detention; conditions of 
detention that fall below appropriate standards for the detainee may also generate an 
infringement of Art 5.  Art 2 to Protocol No.4 to the ECHR provides that ‘everyone lawfully’ 
within the territory of a State has the right to liberty of movement and choice of residence 
subject only to necessary and proportionate restrictions. Thus alternative measures restrictive 
of liberty falling short of detention, such as reporting and residence requirements, are also 
subject to legal regulation under the Protocol. All Member States (except Greece and the 
United Kingdom) have ratified this Protocol, however, Art 45(1) of the Charter confers this 
right only upon all Union citizens. By contrast, under Art 45(2), third country nationals must 
be legally resident and Member States are given a discretion as whether to grant such lawful 
residents this right. There is thus some scope for conflict between the Charter and the 
Protocol despite the obvious common heritage. Art 4 Protocol No. 4 provides a prohibition 
on the collective expulsion of aliens. This implicitly means that detention to effect collective 
deportation is also not permitted. Art 19(1) of the Charter clearly embodies this prohibition. 
The case law of the ECtHR on Art 5 ECHR is particularly pertinent. It is notable that the 
Strasbourg court has, in respect of immigration and extradition cases at least, adopted a 
different approach to that followed by the Human Rights Committee in relation to Art 9 
ICCPR. 
II. United Nations Treaties and Standard-setting 
The embodiment of this most fundamental right is found in Art 9 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (‘UDHR’): ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’. 
This is complemented by UDHR Art 13(1) which confirms that ‘Everyone has the right to 
freedom of movement and residence with the borders of each State.’ These basic ideas were 
developed in Art. 9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) and in 
particular Art 9(1): ‘Everyone has the rights to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on 
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.’ The 
interconnection with conditions of detention is made clear in Art.10 ICCPR - the right of all 
detained persons to be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person and the obligation to separate accused from convicted prisoners.  Art 12 
ICCPR confirms the right of all persons lawfully within the territory to freedom of 
movement. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on the ICCPR, arising in 
relation to individual complaints under Art. 9, has been extensive and influential globally, if 
not in Europe.20  
The mechanism to combat torture and inhuman and degrading treatment in the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT) are very pertinent to detention. The monitoring procedure set up by 
the Optional Protocol to the CAT provides for more detailed visits to detention centres. The 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, 1988 provides a comprehensive code covering the due process rights of 
detainees whilst the conditions of detention are regulated by the Basic Principles for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, 1990. Also important have been the monitoring reports and standard-
setting by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention whose remit covers all the 
appropriate international instruments relating to liberty of the person.21 
As regards the specific position of children, Art 3 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(‘CRC’) confirms that in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration. This is given specific expression in Art 37 CRC which sets out a 
prohibition on arbitrary detention of children but also that detention to be used only as 
measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. 
III Council of Europe Treaties 
Pursuant to Arts1 and 2 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment there is an obligation on States to allow visits by 
monitors to all persons deprived of their liberty by a public authority. The monitoring reports 
of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture are important indicators of evolving 
standards both as regards due process and conditions of detention. They have been 
summarized into general standards.22 In relation to the development of human rights 
standards amongst Council of Europe members, both the Committee of Ministers and 
Parliamentary Assembly have issued important guidance in relation to detention. Most 
importantly, for those convicted of crimes or on remand pending trial, the European Prison 
Rules provide a very detailed set of standards of treatment and due process rights.23 For 
immigration and asylum detainees, there have also been important guidelines issued.24 
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No.5, Report of WGAD, Commission on Human Rights, 56th Session, E/CN.4/2000.4. 
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 Committee for the Prevention of Torture, The CPT Standards [CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev.2006]. 
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 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
European Prison Rules. For a detailed history see D van Zyl Smit and A Snacken, Principles of European 
Prison Law and Policy: Penology and Human Rights (2009) Oxford University Press. 
24
 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2003)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
measures of detention of asylum seekers. Committee of Ministers, Twenty guidelines on force return (2005).  
Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1547 (2002) Expulsion procedures in conformity with human rights 
and enforced with respect for safety and dignity. Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1707 (2010) on detention 
Similarly the European Commissioner for Human Rights has produced a number of 
important monitoring reports on individual countries’ detention practices. 
IV Other Sources 
National constitutions all contain a prohibition on arbitrary detention in various forms as this 
is one of the most well-established fundamental rights. The Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (‘CSR’) contains a number of important references to liberty of the person which 
pertinent to both asylum-seekers and those with full refugee status. Thus Art 9 confirms that 
States may take ‘provisional measures’ (including detention) essential to national security 
pending recognition of refugees.  Under Art 26 CSR there is a right to freedom of movement 
for refugees lawfully in the territory of a State.  Under Art 31(1) CSR no penalties may be 
imposed on refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge coming directly on account of illegal 
entry and (2) restrictions on movement of such refugees must be necessary. There have been 
guidelines on detention of asylum-seekers produced by the Executive Committee that 
oversees the CSR and by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.25 
D. Analysis  
I. General Remarks 
A right to liberty is one of the oldest and most well-established within liberal societies. It has 
close links with the establishment of the rule of law in relation to the exercise of 
governmental power over civil society. As such, the right to liberty is better viewed as a right 
not to be detained arbitrarily. Originally this was conceived of solely in procedural terms: 
detention must follow due process of law. In modern human rights law, however, the right 
increasingly comprises both procedural and substantive components. The state is obliged to 
detain only according to transparent and clear legal authority whilst the grounds of detention 
should generally be linked to sufficiently pressing goals of public policy to support removal 
of liberty. Furthermore, the conditions of detention themselves and their effects upon 
particular detainees have increasingly come to be evaluated against the nature of the state’s 
public policy goals using proportionality analysis.  
The Union has increasingly itself come to adopt public policy goals which impinge upon 
personal liberty for their fulfilment. The most direct of these is in relation to asylum and 
border policy where the Union’s goal of preventing unlawful migration and secondary 
movements, particularly of asylum-seekers, within Europe has led to the imposition of 
common obligations, including detention powers. The Union has also expressed its own 
shared public policy in relation to the creation of criminal offences for conduct that has a 
trans-border element or impinges upon the fulfilment of Union policy goals. The final main 
area of Union activity is more about facilitation of Member States’ criminal justice policies 
through co-operation to render more rapid returns of suspected and convicted criminals in 
other Member States.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
of asylum-seekers and irregular migrants in Europe.  Recommendation Rec (2003)5 was cited by the Court of 
Justice in El Dridi (C-61/11 PPU ) [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 6 at para 43. 
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 Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and 
Alternatives to Detention, (2012) UNHCR, Geneva.  UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No.44 (1986) 
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Neither Advocates-General nor the Court of Justice has yet to render any direct opinion in 
which Article 6 was directly relied upon, despite giving several rulings in cases in which 
detention was in issue since the Charter’s ratification. These cases have all concerned non-
EU citizens subject to migration control and the Court of Justice has adopted an approach 
looking at the overall legislative scheme governing expulsion and detention rather than 
follow an explicitly fundamental rights approach.26  
II. Scope of Application  
II.1 Relationship with Free Movement Law and Purely Internal Situations 
The right of EU citizens to move and reside freely within the Union pursuant to Articles 
20 and 21 TFEU necessarily entails respect for the right to liberty and security of the person. 
This right is embodied in Article 45 of the Charter. The Court of Justice has often ruled 
against obstacles to such movement when imposed by Member States. In Oulane27 an EU 
citizen was present in another Member State with a temporary right of residence as a 
recipient of services.28 The European Court of Justice held that, whilst Member States could 
impose a penalty for failure to hold an identity document [d]etention and deportation based 
solely on the failure of the person concerned to comply with legal formalities concerning the 
monitoring of aliens impair the very substance of the right of residence conferred directly by 
Community law and are manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the infringement.29 
[italics added] The failure to comply with such rules did not constitute a threat to public 
policy or security.30 There had to be a core security justification for detention such as that the 
migrant would commit criminal acts.31 Detention orders, like deportation, can be justified but 
only based on the express deportation grounds of public policy, security or health set out in 
TFEU.32  
For non-EU citizens, only those who are long-residents acquire free movement rights 
under Union law for those who have stayed for a qualifying period in a Member State. Whilst 
it confers powers of expulsion and/or withdrawal of residence permits on narrow public 
policy grounds, there is no mention of detention.33 There is only an oblique reference in that 
each Member States expelling a non-EU citizen ‘shall take all the appropriate measure to 
effectively implement it.’34 Similar considerations apply to the Family Reunification 
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Directive.35 This gives rights to non-EU citizens to join and reside with their non-EU resident 
families in the Union.36 There are public policy exclusion and expulsion powers37 but again 
there is no requirement to implement these orders by arrest and detention.38 
The concept of obstacles to free movement may also have relevance for detention 
pursuant to criminal offences under Article 5(1)(a) ECHR. The Court of Justice has been 
willing to rule that penalties which are disproportionate in their impact on the ability of EU 
citizens to exercise their freedom of movement may be in breach of EU law.39 Therefore any 
detention pursuant to such a sentence would have to cease although it seems unlikely that 
such detention would breach Article 5(1)(a) until the national criminal law had been declared 
in breach of EU law.40 For EU citizens imprisoned in their own Member State who have 
never crossed a border however, the orthodox position is that they are caught by the ‘purely 
internal situation’ rule and cannot rely upon free movement rights to challenge their criminal 
conviction.41 
II.2  Personal and Territorial Scope 
The right to liberty is one possessed by all natural persons, regardless of nationality or 
immigration status. The geographical scope of the right may extend beyond the territorial 
waters of the Member States; to the extent that Union agencies and/or Member States engage 
in actions outside the borders of the Union which affect personal liberty, they may be bound 
by Article 6.42 The use of naval or coast guard operations against migrant smuggling vessels, 
which forms part of Union policy to combat illegal migration, may therefore engage Article 6 
to the extent that physical restraint is exercised over individuals.43 Detentions that are 
conducted by the authorities of non-EU countries which border the Union would not 
ordinarily lead the Member States or the EU institutions to incur Article 6 obligations, even 
though the Union increasingly provides funds and training for border control operations to its 
neighbours. 
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III. Specific Provisions 
The explanatory notes on the Charter state that the rights in Article 6 have the same meaning 
and scope as Article 5 ECHR.  This extends therefore to both the meaning of ‘liberty and 
security of the person’ but also to the legitimate limitations that may be placed thereupon 
which are exhaustive and set out in Articles 5(1)(a)-(f) ECHR.44 The one area of doubt is 
imprisonment for debt which is prohibited by Art 1 Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR but which is 
not referred to in the Charter or the explanatory text. It is assumed that this is an oversight 
and that this does limit further the scope of imprisonment in compliance with Art 6 of the 
Charter. The Court of Justice has not yet provided any interpretation of Article 5 ECHR 
either as part of the general principles of EU law, nor through the Charter.45 Because of this, 
the extensive Article 5 ECHR case-law of the Strasbourg court will remain the principal 
source of guidance on the meaning of Article 6 of the Charter. This section will not seek to 
reproduce all the Strasbourg case-law but rather to focus upon those areas that are of 
particular relevance as falling within the scope of Union law. 
Definition of Deprivation of Liberty  
 
The reference to ‘liberty’ does not denote any broader concept of freedom in general but is  
merely a right not to be subject to arbitrary bodily restraint. Furthermore, the primary focus 
of Article 5 ECHR is upon regulating deprivation of liberty; ‘security’ of the person does not 
raise distinct considerations.46  The Strasbourg court has distinguished restrictions on liberty, 
such as residence requirements, from deprivations of liberty amounting to an infringement of 
Article 5. 47 The distinction is however one of fact and degree and not kind, with the duration, 
conditions, effects and manner of detention being relevant along with the particular type of 
detainee held. Thus confining soldiers to barracks was not a deprivation of liberty whilst 
keeping them in locked cells was.48 The holding of asylum-seekers in airport transit facilities 
was examined in Amuur v France.49 The Court said that ‘such holding should not be 
prolonged excessively, otherwise there would be a risk of it turning a mere restriction on 
liberty – inevitable with a view to organising the practical details of the aliens’ repatriation or 
where he has requested asylum while his application for leave to enter the territory for that 
purpose is considered - into a deprivation of liberty.’50 In that case, holding the applicants in 
locked hotel rooms for several weeks was a deprivation of liberty. In Saadi v UK, asylum-
seekers were held in closed facilities permitting some degree of movement inside a perimeter 
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for seven days to process their claims. This was also held to be a deprivation of liberty for 
Article 5(1) purposes.51   
 
IV. Limitations and Derogations 
  
Detention must be both legal and non-arbitrary 
 
The concept of preventing arbitrariness in detention decisions is crucial to Article 5.52 This 
comprises both complying with national law regarding the substantive and procedural 
grounds for detention but also complying with constraints imposed by Article 5 and its 
jurisrprudence. The list of grounds permitting detention under Article 5(1) is thus 
exhaustive.53 It is vital to note however that there is no general requirement that detention 
must be ordered by a court. Whilst Article 5(4) requires that detainees have access to judicial 
review in all cases, only criminal suspects must be brought by the government before a court 
under Article 5(3). The main safeguard against arbitrariness therefore lies in ensuring that 
national laws and practices are sufficiently clear and transparent that courts can assess the 
character and legality of detention rather in than in judicial pre-authorisation.54 There is a 
positive obligation upon States to protect individuals against arbitrary detention where they 
are aware or ought to be aware that it is occurring.55 This is designed to ensure protection for 
those held by private actors such as hospitals and security firms which increasingly 
supplement state actors in management of prisons and detention centres. 
 
Detention must be in accordance with the law 
 
The most basic requirement here is that detention be in ‘accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law.’ This means firstly that substantial national rules governing the detention 
must be complied with.56   There is an unresolved question at present as regards which ‘law’ 
must be complied with; should it national or European Union law? Where there are two sets 
of standards there is scope for confusion. This is particularly so with EU Directives which, 
according to Article 288 TFEU,  should be implemented in national law but are sometimes 
incorrectly transposed or neglected altogether.  It is thus not clear which norms should bind 
national officials for the purpose of Article 5. The principle of legal certainty suggests that 
detainees should be able to easily know the sources of law relied upon for their detention and 
the limitations upon this power. Nevertheless, it is submitted that, given the importance of the 
right in question,  the rules most favourable to the preservation of liberty should be the ones 
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that are binding on officials.    This is increasingly important because EU law now imposes 
time-limits upon detention under the Framework Directive on the European Arrest Warrant, 
the Returns Directive and the recast Dublin II Regulation. Depending upon the precise 
circumstances, it might be that a combination of domestic and EU norms should therefore be 
considered binding. Certainly, in relation to Article 3 ECHR at least, the European Court of 
Human Rights has found that breach of a Directive can contribute to creating liability.57  
 
If the applicable law states that the detention power may only be exercised when strictly 
necessary, failure to show how this was met renders the decision not in accordance with the 
law.58 The laws must be operated in good faith and not involve, for example, the use of 
deception to induce persons to surrender themselves.59  Merely procedural errors will 
however not infringe the principle.60 More importantly, even if the national rules are 
complied with, the Convention requires these to meet minimum standards of clarity and 
accessibility. Thus when in Amuur v France61 the detention procedures were contained in an 
unpublished circular which was not available to lawyers or detainees and did not state clearly 
the limits upon detention nor the available judicial remedies, this was a breach. The detainee 
should have the reasons for detention and remedies explained to them in their own language, 
be afforded access to an interpreter and given the possibility to contact a lawyer. 62 There 
must be a reasoned decision which shows how the detention is justified in terms of the 
national legal framework.63  Overall, the rules governing detention must enable the detainee 
to understand the basis for detention, the conditions upon its prolongation and provide 
predictable guidelines as to its exercise.64 
 
Imprisonment after conviction by a court 
In its case-law on Art 5(1)(a) the ECtHR has found that the crucial issue is that imprisonment 
follows conviction by an independent court, with power under domestic law to order the 
detention in question, which is separate from both the executive branch of government and 
the parties.65 The imprisonment may commence immediately upon conviction whilst an 
appeal is pending.66 The merits of the conviction are not examined by the ECtHR under 
Article 5.67 Indeed, time spent in detention is not rendered unlawful by the subsequent 
quashing of the conviction upon which it was based.68 The returning of convicted prisoners to 
detention after their release on license falls within Article 5(1)(a) so long as there is a 
sufficient connection between the original conviction and any new risk posed by the 
prisoner.69 The Strasbourg Court has approved preventive detention, following conviction by 
a court, where the sentencing court later rules that the prisoner’s release would be a danger to 
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public security so long as the power is not one that was created to apply retrospectively to 
persons already convicted. 70  
Where a prisoner has been detained based upon a criminal conviction that breaches EU law, 
the position under Article 5(1)(a) is unresolved. Whilst subsequent quashing by a higher 
court does not normally render detention out-with Article 5(1)(a), different considerations 
may apply when a conviction breaches well-established EU law principles and therefore, 
arguably, a national court lacks jurisdiction to impose liability.71  The most important limits 
in general terms are those relating to Directives. Because these instruments normally require 
national implementation, there is a risk of legal uncertainty. The Court of Justice has 
therefore held that national courts must not use a Directive as the basis for imposing or 
worsening criminal liability that did not clearly arise under national law.72 Furthermore, EU 
measures must not found the basis for criminal liability which is imposed retrospectively.73  
More specifically, recent decisions by the Court of Justice in relation to unlawful migration 
have limited the ability of Member States to impose criminal sanctions for immigration 
offences. The Court found that the administrative provisions in the Returns Directive must be 
complied with to secure speedy expulsions of non-EU citizens. 74 Member States were not 
allowed to impose detention following criminal conviction for illegal stay before the 
administrative measures had been applied. This means that imposing liability for offences of 
failing to leave after a removal order had been served or illegal entry were in breach of Union 
law.75   Member States have the power to impose “penal sanctions” under national law on 
irregular migrants only after the administrative measures have been applied and failed. A fine 
for illegal stay may be imposed but not detention in lieu of payment unless removal is not 
possible at that time.76 
It is EU policy to ensure mutual recognition of criminal convictions and sentences by the 
Member States to allow migrant prisoners convicted in one State to be returned to complete 
their sentences in their home states. This is facilitated by a Council Framework Decision.77 
The compatibility of this with Article 5 ECHR is however unclear because Member States 
adopt different approaches to early release. If  the ‘competent court’ sentencing in the first 
Member State would have released a prisoner earlier than occurs in the home Member State, 
this would arguably render their continued detention unlawful. Finally, the existence of 
mutual recognition of Supervision Orders under the Framework Decision means that EU 
criminal courts should not impose a custodial sentence on a non-resident where a non-
custodial sentence would be given to a resident. To do so would be discriminatory on 
grounds of nationality/residence and would arguably breach Article 5 ECHR combined with 
Article 14 ECHR. It would also breach more general EU standards relating to free movement 
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and the equal treatment of Union citizens under Article 18 and 20 of the TFEU. This is 
because to imprison a person because they are non-resident indirectly discriminates on 
grounds of nationality. Whilst formerly the absence of a system of mutual recognition of non-
custodial orders might have justified such discrimination, the new legislative framework 
means this can no longer be the case.78  
Detention for non-compliance with a lawful court order or to secure compliance with a legal 
obligation 
The first part of Art 5(1)(b) ECHR pertains to the process by which a court seeks to secure 
the attendance of a witness at trial or that a witness undergo a medical examination. Wilful 
failure to pay a tax could also support detention.79 Whilst Art 5(1)(b) on its face authorises 
detention to compel repayment of a contractual debt, Article 1 of the Fourth Protocol to the 
Convention says that ‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty merely on the ground of 
inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.’ The second part of Art 5(1)(b) is more 
controversial because it allows a non-judicial body to detain a person to secure compliance 
with administrative or security operations. The classic example would be enforcing 
attendance for military service.  The ECtHR has held that legal obligations entailing the risk 
of detention must be specific and should clearly state that liability to detention arises in such 
cases.80 Art 5(1)(b) does not entail a more general power to detain to prevent crime or threats 
to public order or safety.  All such detention must conform to the principle of proportionality 
and thereby strike a reasonable balance between the fulfilling the legal obligation and the 
deprivation of liberty. This requires an examination of the object of the legal obligation, the 
characteristics of the person detained and the duration of detention.81 
Detention pending trial: the arrest period and the remand period  
Article 5(1)(c) authorizes and regulates detention pursuant to criminal proceedings from 
arrest through to trial and acquittal or conviction. It must be read with Article 5(3) which 
governs the arrest period and any remand in custody. The literal text of Article 5(1)(c) 
contemplates detention in three cases; (1) where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that an offence has been committed but also (2) when it is reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent the commission of an offence or (3) to prevent someone fleeing having done so.  
Although this apparently permits preventive detention, case-law has determined that the 
power to detain under Art 5(1)(c) generally arises only where there are reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that a specific offence has been committed. Only a concrete and specific threat 
can support preventive detention.82  Because most acts preparatory to the commission of 
serious crimes are themselves crimes, there is rarely a need to rely upon the preventive 
detention justification. Furthermore, in any event, the purpose of detention must be to bring 
the suspect to trial before the competent authority.83  
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Although Art 5(1)(c) does not itself impose a duty to use arrest as a last resort,  national law 
often will require proof that arrest is necessary in order to investigate the suspected crime 
because of a risk of absconding. The arrest of a person should be effected on the basis of a 
warrant issued by a competent court but in urgent cases police may arrest without a warrant. 
The standard of proof is that of ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an offence has been committed, 
which entails facts or information that would satisfy an objective observer.84 The appraisal of 
whether evidence meets this standard is generally for the national court to decide subject only 
to oversight by the European Court of Human Rights. In combating terrorism, a lighter 
evidential burden is imposed, but there must still be objective evidence of the commission of 
an offence.85 
Whilst the initial grounds for arrest must conform to Article 5(1)(c), thereafter continued 
detention must comply with Article 5(3) which requires both that a suspect be brought 
promptly before a judicial officer following arrest and thereafter tried within a reasonable 
time or released on bail pending trial. ‘Promptly’ does not mean a set period in all cases but 
in ordinary criminal cases, not involving national security, several days is the limit.86 
Detention beyond this period is unlawful unless a derogation under Article 15 has been 
validly entered.87 Even in cases involving a derogation however a period of two weeks in 
incommunicado detention was a breach of Article 5(3).88 The officer before whom the 
detainee is brought must be sufficiently independent of the prosecution process.89 
Once the detainee has been brought before a judicial officer, there is a presumption that they 
must be released on bail90 unless their detention pending trial is necessary. The case-law goes 
beyond the text of Article 5(3) which appears to permit detention which is not necessary so 
long as the trial takes place within a reasonable time. Even where there is strong evidence the 
accused has committed a serious offence, this does not in itself justify remand beyond a short 
period.91 Mandatory pre-trial detention is unlawful as each case must be assessed 
individually.92 The Strasbourg court has not given an exhaustive list of the grounds for 
remanding in custody but has thus far endorsed the use of pre-trial detention to prevent 
absconding, the commission of offences or interference with the trial processes.93 The 
national court must consider whether a risk of absconding can be avoided by bail or other 
restrictions94 and these must be tailored to the individual detainee’s financial situation rather 
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than set at an excessive or fixed level.95 In the case of non-resident defendants, the possibility 
of imposing an EU Supervision Order must be considered as an alternative to custody where 
concerns about absconding to another Member State exist. 
The substantive grounds for remand must be reviewed and justified on an ongoing basis, even 
if the initial remand in custody was justified.96 Even where the substantive grounds for 
remand are adequate, the period of detention itself must also be reasonable which is assessed 
in view of all the circumstances of the case. The starting point is that detention infringes a 
fundamental right of a person presumed to be innocent and the authorities therefore have to 
show that they acted with special diligence in bringing the case to trial.97 Where there have 
been significant periods of inactivity in the prosecution lasting months (sometimes resulting 
in pre-trial detention for several years) a violation of Article 5(3) has been found.98 
In the EU context, there are wide variations in the rules and processes in the different 
Member States regarding pre-trial detention. These divergences are significant in the context 
of the European Arrest Warrant for two reasons. First, the possibility that a person 
surrendered will be subject to a long period of pre-trial detention may raise an issue of 
fundamental rights for the surrendering court. The European Council identified this as an 
obstacle to judicial cooperation in the Stockholm programme. Second, the availability of the 
European Arrest Warrant procedures means that there an alternative to pre-trial detention in 
cases where a suspect lives in another Member State. Previously, criminal courts might 
choose to detain pending trial (or impose a custodial sentence) simply because they feared 
that a person would abscond back to their home country and that ensuring their return to face 
trial (or their completion of a non-custodial sentence) would be difficult. Compliance with 
Article 5(3) ECHR would require that a court consider these less restrictive measures as an 
alternative to remand in custody. 
Detention of minors 
Art 5(1)(d) permits detention of minors for the purpose of educational supervision or to bring 
them before a competent legal authority (usually the juvenile courts seized of non-criminal 
cases). It does however preclude detention under any other heading of Article 5 such as 
pursuant to criminal proceedings. The official age of majority varies between States. The 
concept of a ‘minor’ however has an autonomous meaning for Art 5(1)(d) purposes which is 
distinct from national law and is presently eighteen.99  Under the first limb, the detention 
must have genuine educational aspects in order to be lawful. Where a boy was detained in an 
adult prison, prior to placement, because no suitable juvenile institution would accept him 
immediately, there was a violation.100 This said, the concept of ‘educational supervision’ is 
flexible and not to be equated with traditional classroom teaching; the crucial issue is that a 
caring regime, including education elements, is provided. 
Detention for the purpose of health or social protection 
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On a literal reading, Art 5(1)(e) permits detention of a wide group of persons without court 
order including drug addicts, alcoholics, the mentally ill and those with infectious diseases. In 
practice, the ECtHR has limited this wide power in several respects. First, it requires that 
detention be used only to protect the safety of either the detainee or the public.101 Second, 
such detention must only be used when necessary and no alternative means for protecting the 
public less draconian than detention will suffice. 102Finally, the detention must strike a 
reasonable balance between the public interest and the liberty of the detainee. In the special 
case of person with mental illness, the Court has imposed more detailed guidance in the case 
of Winterwerp v Netherlands103 where it said that mental illness must be established by 
objective medical evidence, that the condition must make detention necessary, that the 
detention must be justified on an ongoing basis and, later, that the place and conditions of 
detention must be suitable – a hospital or clinic not a prison.104 
 
Detention for immigration control and extradition purposes 
The most important areas of Union competence and law-making impinging on liberty relate 
to immigration powers over non-EU citizens and the extradition of suspects and convicted 
criminals. Both these restrictions on liberty fall under the justification in Article 5(1)(f) and 
there is extensive Strasbourg case-law interpreting this provision that will be set out below 
No Requirement that Detention be Necessary  in Immigration Cases 
The Strasbourg court has consistently contrasted Article 5(1)(f) with detention under the 
other headings of Article 5(1) by ruling that detention need not be necessary and 
proportionate to secure the deportation or extradition of a detainee nor to prevent their illegal 
entry.105  This also contrasts with remand pending prosecution which requires a specific 
public policy reason, such as a risk of absconding, for continuing detention pursuant to 
Article 5(3).106 The basis for this distinction is that sovereign states have the right to control 
their borders and that aliens without permission to remain do not have the same general right 
to liberty as citizens.  Instead of the usual proportionality test, the Strasbourg court has 
therefore applied a test of arbitrariness to Article 5(1)(f) comprising four factors: 
 
‘to avoid being branded as arbitrary…such detention must be carried out in good 
faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of 
the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be 
appropriate, bearing in mind that “the measure is applicable not to those who have 
committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have 
fled from their own country”...and the length of the detention should not exceed that 
reasonably required for the purpose pursued’107  
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Thus in Saadi108 the applicant, who had entered illegally and then sought asylum, was not 
considered a flight risk but was held for seven days in a closed reception centre as part of the 
processing of his asylum claim. The Grand Chamber accepted that this period of detention in 
relatively relaxed conditions with access to lawyers and interpreters did not breach Article 
5(1)(f). It ruled that until a detainee had been given permission to enter or stay, such 
detention was sufficiently closely linked to the prevention of unauthorized entry even when a 
detainee had presented himself voluntarily to make an asylum claim. Detention of asylum 
seekers for processing their claims, whilst not formally subject to different principles to those 
governing detention of immigrants generally, is likely to infringe Article 5(1)(f) if the 
conditions or the duration are significantly more restrictive of liberty than those in Saadi, in 
the absence of other special factors, such as a flight risk.109  
Whilst enforcing European Union legislation relating to irregular migrants, the Court 
of Justice has held that Member States must have a brief but reasonable time110 to verify 
whether a third country national is an irregular migrant. During this time they must act with 
diligence and may detain the person concerned under the conditions provided for in national 
law. Once it has been established that the migrant has no right to remain on their territory 
they must issue a return order and proceed to enforce it. The object of that procedure is the 
physical transportation of the person concerned outside the Member State concerned111 and it 
should take place as soon as possible.112 
 In keeping with the factors set out in Saadi, the conditions of detention for 
minors and other vulnerable groups raise particular issues and may breach Article 5 (as a 
distinct ground to any breach under Article 3 ECHR). In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki 
Mitunga v. Belgium,
113
 a five year old unaccompanied minor was detained for two months in 
a centre designed for adults. She was not assigned any specialist care, counseling or 
education. The Court found a breach of Article 3 and referred to the obligation of the State to 
enable effective protection to be provided, particularly to children and other vulnerable 
members of society which should include reasonable measures to prevent ill-treatment of 
which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge.114  In the case of Muskhadziyeva v 
Belgium
115
 a family including four children aged between seven months and seven years were 
held together for one month in a closed detention centre designed for adults. In this case, the 
Court found a violation of Article 3 in respect of the children, despite the presence of their 
parents, because of the duration of detention, the age of the children, the medical evidence of 
psychological damage to one of them caused by ongoing detention and because of persistent 
adverse reports on the centre by independent monitors.116 The court also found a violation of 
Article 5(1)(f) in the case of the children because the means used, including the place and 
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Duration of Detention in Immigration Cases 
 
The Strasbourg court has recognized that detention could be indefinite under Article 5(1)(f) if 
a state were able to justify detention merely by showing that immigration or extradition 
proceedings remained ongoing. Instead a state must show that such proceedings are being 
pursued with ‘due diligence.’120  This requires a fact-specific examination of the steps taken 
by the authorities to process the proceedings, the complexity of the case and responsibility of 
the detainee for prolonging their detention. Long periods of detention has sometimes been 
found to be compliant with Article 5(1)(f).  For example in Chahal, detention for six years in 
total, including periods of six and seven months waiting for initial and fresh decisions from 
the immigration authorities were held not to be a violation because of the serious nature of 
the case and the complexity. By contrast, in another, extradition, case the Court ruled that 
delays of three and ten months violated Article 5(1)(f).121 In Singh v Czech Republic,122 
immigration detention of two and half years was criticised because it contained long periods 
of inactivity by the authorities when faced with practical obstacles to removal.  Such 
obstacles to removal may require the detaining State to act ‘vigorously’ to secure travel 
documents or to negotiate with foreign States to satisfy the test. 123 
Expulsion must be a realistic prospect to justify continued detention. Where a State 
accepts that it cannot deport a person due to a legal or other obstacle that is not likely to be 
removed within a foreseeable period, then there is no justification for detention under Article 
5(1)(f).124  In Mikolenko v Estonia125 the detainee had said at the outset he would not co-
operate with documentation procedures and there was no readmission agreement with his 
country of nationality.  The Court said that it must have become clear quite soon that 
expulsion attempts were bound to fail.126  Strasbourg court found a breach due to the lack of a 
realistic prospect of his expulsion and the domestic authorities’ failure to conduct the 
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proceedings with due diligence.127 The Court also noted that he had been released on bail 
eventually without incident and therefore the authorities had at their disposal measures other 
than the applicant’s protracted detention  in the absence of any immediate prospect of his 
expulsion. This case suggests that the longer detention is prolonged, the more obligation there 
is to consider using alternative means such as release on bail, even if this was not required at 
the outset. 
Discussion of EU immigration and asylum measures pertinent to Article 5(1)(f) ECHR 
 
Measures taken by the European Union and their application by the Member States must 
comply with Article 6 of the Charter and the principles set out above in relation to Article 





The common code128 on border movements which sets out the rules governing non-EU 
citizens seeking to enter the Union at the border of any Member State.129 Persons not 
fulfilling the requirements for entry ‘shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member 
States.’130 Where this occurs ‘border guards shall ensure that a third-country national refused 
entry does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned.’131 [italics added] This 
authorizes physical restraint in cases of resistance but ‘any measures taken in the 
performance of [border guards] duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by 
such measures.’132 Guards must also not discriminate on specified grounds and must ‘fully 
respect human dignity.’133 These provisions permit detention. They may be consistent with 
Article 5(1)(f) ECHR in that they seek to prevent unlawful entry into the Union but they must 
be operated in accordance with the principles discussed above.  
 
Detention of Resident Third Country Nationals  
 
The Long-resident Directive confers powers of expulsion and/or withdrawal of residence 
permits on public policy grounds and therefore impliedly authorises detention.134 Member 
States expelling a non-EU citizen ‘shall take all the appropriate measure to effectively 
implement it.’135 Similar considerations apply to the Family Reunification Directive136 which 
gives rights to non-EU citizens to join and reside with their non-EU resident families in the 
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Union.137 There are public policy exclusion and expulsion powers138 but again there is no 
requirement to implement these orders by arrest and detention.139 These implied powers of 
detention must be operated in a manner consistent with the principles discussed above. 
Detention in Asylum Claims 
 
The EU measures bearing on the detention of asylum-seekers are not found in a single 
instrument. The most important source is however the Reception Conditions Directive which 
governs the treatment of all asylum-seekers from outside the EU during the processing of 
their claims and any appeals against refusal of asylum. It also covers fresh claims made 
subsequent to earlier claims being rejected.140 Whilst an asylum application or appeal against 
refusal of asylum are on-going, this Directive applies, even where deportation or removal 
orders are in place. The Court of Justice has held that only when no such asylum application 
or appeal is on foot will the Returns Directive apply to regulate, inter alia, detention of 
irregular migrants.141  This unfortunately means that a detainee may fall in and out of the two 
detention regimes – pertaining to asylum and irregular migration - depending whether they 
have an ongoing asylum claim. The present Reception Conditions Directive does not provide 
a clear and detailed code on detention of asylum-seekers but the basic elements are 
discernible. Article 7(1) of the Directive (based on Article 31 of the Refugee Convention) 
confirms that asylum-seekers may move freely within the territory of the host Member State 
or within an area assigned to them. Their place of residence may be assigned on the basis of 
public interest, public order or the need for swift and efficient processing of claims. Under 
Article 7(3) detention is permissible where it proves necessary for ‘legal reasons or reasons 
of public order.’ 142 These reasons are not further defined but must be read in conformity with 
Article 6 of the Charter. Therefore, detention must only be imposed to prevent an immediate 
threat of the commission of a specific criminal offence or to prevent the effecting of an 
unlawful entry into the country in accordance with the principles in Saadi. In both cases, any 
detention must conform to the principles set out above regarding Articles 5(1)(b) and 5(1)(f) 
ECHR.  
Under Article 18 of the Procedures Directive no one may be detained solely because they 
have made an asylum claim. Detention purely for administrative reasons in order to process a 
claim is not expressly authorised by the Reception Conditions Directive but such a practice is 
compatible with Article 6 if the period is brief in accordance with the Saadi decision. Saadi 
also held that the conditions of detention must take into account the vulnerable position of 
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asylum-seekers. The Reception Conditions Directive requires that accommodation be 
specifically-provided for this purpose (Article 14) unless exceptional circumstances apply 
(Article 14(8)) justifying a short period in non-suitable accommodation. Unaccompanied 
minors must be housed with relatives, foster carers or in accommodation centres that have 
special provision for minors (Art 19). For minors generally, there is an obligation to provide 
education (Art 10) but this may occur within an accommodation centre. Whilst there is no 
general obligation not to detain minors their best interests must be a primary consideration 
(Art 18). To comply with the case-law on Article 5 ECHR, minors should not be detained for 
long and only in facilities that are caring and educational in nature.  
The agreed revised Reception Conditions Directive goes much further in setting out and 
regulating conditions for detention.143 It confirms the basic right to free movement within the 
territory.144 Detention must therefore be shown to be necessary, after an individual 
assessment has been made and when less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively, in 
order to: (a) verify identity or nationality (b) determine an asylum claim where this would not 
otherwise be possible because of, in particular, a risk of absconding; (c) decide on a 
applicant’s right to enter the territory (d) effect removal under the Returns Directive where 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the application for international protection was 
made merely to delay or frustrate the return decision (e) when national security or public 
order requires it and (f) to fulfil the procedure for returns to another Member State under the 
Dublin II Convention. Even the revised Directive does not contain a maximum period of 
detention for all asylum-seekers but must be as short as possible and accompanied by due 
diligence in procedures.145 It is arguable that where detention is purely administrative, as 
under headings (a) and (c) it must not exceed the short period of seven days that formed the 
benchmark in Saadi. Detention under (f) must be justified separately under the specific rules 
(and follow the time-limits) set out in the Dublin II Regulation (see below for discussion of 
the revised Regulation) which must be considered as lex specialis. It is not clear if detention 
under heading (d) must be viewed as occurring under the Reception Conditions Directive 
during the period when a protection claim made by a detainee is under consideration.146 In 
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general terms, detention may be ordered by judicial or administrative authorities. If 
authorised by an administrative body it must however be reviewed speedily ex officio and/or 
at the request of the detainee. This provision appears to permit Member States to choose not 
to require automatic judicial review so long as detainees can themselves initiate speedy 
proceedings. There must be reviews of detention as reasonable intervals, particularly when it 
is prolonged or new information bearing on its justification arises.  
The current Dublin II Regulation is silent on detention itself, as opposed to removal to 
another EU Member State for processing, for which there is a detailed time-table. This 
contemplates removal occuring within six months in most cases. The Court of Justice has 
ruled that Member States are required to adhere to the obligation under the Reception 
Conditions even for persons whom they believe are the responsibility of another Member 
State.147 This should therefore regulate their detention. The lack of a code to regulate 
detention during this period led the European Commission to proposed detailed amendments 
to the Regulation.148 The principle has been accepted by the legislature now which has 
endorsed a much more comprehensive system. The new rules permit detention only when 
there is a significant risk of absconding, based upon an individual assessment. Detention must 
be proportional and used only when other non-custodial alternatives cannot be effectively 
applied.149 The duration of detention must be for as short as possible and due diligence must 
be shown in processing the return application. Most importantly, there is are now time-limits 
on detention.150 Thus a take charge or take back request must be made within one month of 
the asylum application. The detainee must be released if this is exceeded. A reply should be 
issued within two weeks by the requested Member State. Failure to do so means the request is 
deemed accepted. The transfer must occur within six weeks of this implied acceptance (or of 
the date of an express acceptance if earlier). The detainee must be released if this time-limit 
(in effect a maximum of twelve weeks) is breached.  
 
Detention pursuant to Expulsion under the Returns Directive  
The most important Union law authorising detention is the Returns Directive. It provides a 
comprehensive system for regulating detention in all cases when a third-country national is 
found to be illegally present in the EU. This Directive also applies to asylum-seekers whose 
claims have been rejected if they have no valid permission to stay and no asylum appeal 
ongoing.151 The Directive does contain elements that go beyond the obligations set out by the 
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Strasbourg court under Article 5(1)(f). Thus a period allowing voluntary return must be 
considered before detention and expulsion are ordered unless there is a risk of absconding, 
the migrant’s stay was fraudulent or there is a risk to public policy or security (Article 7). 
Detention is only possible where there is a risk of absconding or the immigrant hampers the 
removal process (Article 15(1)). Detention must therefore be necessary to prepare or carry 
out the removal process. Detention must be for as short a period as possible and only 
maintained whilst removal arrangements are in progress and executive with due diligence. 
Detention must cease immediately when it appears that there is no longer a reasonable 
prospect of removal. Most importantly, the periods of detention are regulated explicitly 
limited under Article 15 which imposes time-limits of six months (Article 15(5) (extendable 
by a further twelve months in cases of non-cooperation by the detainee or third countries 
(Article 15(6)). The Court of Justice considered these provisions in Kadzoev.152 The Court 
held that there is a reasonable prospect of removal only where it appears that the migrant will 
be admitted to a third country within the 18-month period provided for in article 15(5) and 
(6).153 Thus, that period performs a double function: it is the limit on pre-removal detention 
and the benchmark for assessing whether there is a reasonable prospect of removal.154 This is 
however potentially inconsistent with the judgement in Mikolenko155 which held that where a 
detainee refuses from the outset to co-operate then there can be no realistic prospect of 
removal and the further detention is a breach of Article 5(1)(f). The judgment in Kadzoev 
however makes clear that detention under the Returns Directive cannot exceed the 18-month 
limit set in article 15(6); where this is reached, the detained migrant must be released 
immediately, regardless of public order concerns, because the removal process is then at an 
end.   
Detention Pursuant to the European Arrest Warrant156 
The expedited procedures under the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant 
must be viewed as a type of extradition proceedings and therefore subject to the same 
principles as set out above for Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The issuing judicial authority in one 
Member State directs an arrest warrant at an executing judicial authority in another Member 
State with a view to securing the arrest and surrender of a requested person for the purpose of 
conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.157 
Recital 12 states that the Framework Decision ‘respects fundamental rights and observes the 
principles...reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’. The 
Framework Decision itself does not however contain a detailed regulatory code on arrest and 
detention as distinct from the main proceedings. The main Article authorising arrest refers 
only to national law: 
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‘When a person is arrested on the basis of a European arrest warrant, the executing judicial 
authority shall take a decision on whether the requested person should remain in detention, in 
accordance with the law of the executing Member State. The person may be released 
promptly at any time in conformity with the domestic law of the executing Member State, 
provided that the competent authority of the said Member State takes all the measures it 
deems necessary to prevent the person absconding.’(Article12) 
Article 12 assumes that a person will be arrested at the outset and that only thereafter will 
release be considered. This is not inconsistent with Article 5(1)(f) ECHR in so far as the 
arrest relates to a person ‘against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition’.  Article 12 goes further than Article 5(1)(f) in suggesting that release may occur 
so long as measures to prevent absconding are taken.  Other provisions in the Framework 
Decision relating to the main proceedings also provide procedural guarantees pertinent to 
Article 5 ECHR. Thus Article 11 provides the detainee with the right to know the about the 
warrant and its contents and to be assisted by a lawyer and interpreter in accordance with 
national law. Compliance with Article 5(1)(f) would also require a separate reasoned decision 
on the reason for detention. The detainee ‘shall be heard by a judicial authority’ pending a 
decision on the execution of a European Arrest Warrant (Article 19). This provision does not 
however explicitly state that the detainee may challenge the legality of the detention itself as 
required by Article 5(4) ECHR. Where the real concern relates to issues of criminal 
procedure,  rather than any specific complaint about the detention itself,  the Court of Justice 
has held that the relevant right is not Article 5 ECHR (and Article 6 Charter) but rather the 
right to a fair trial (Charter Articles 47 and 48).158 
The strict legal time-limits regarding the execution of European Arrest Warrants, if complied 
with, meet the ‘due diligence’ test. Thus Article 17(3) requires a final decision on execution 
of the warrant to be made within 60 days after the arrest in most cases or 10 days if the 
detainee consents to their surrender. This may be extended by 30 days only. Surrender must 
take place as soon as possible and in any event within 10 days of the final decision (Article 
23(2). This may only be extended by 10 days due to circumstances beyond the control of any 
of the Member States (Article 23(3). Surrender may be suspended for serious humanitarian 
reasons but once these cease to exist a new date must be agreed and the surrender follow 
within 10 days of this date (23(4). Importantly, upon expiry of these time limits ‘if the person 
is still being held in custody he shall be released’ (Article 23(5). Finally, the period of 
detention served in the executing Member States must be deducted from the sentence to be 
served in the issuing State (Article 26). 
When a Member State has substantial grounds for believing that a person whom it 
returns to another Member State under the EAW may face detention which is in flagrant 
violation of Article 6 then arguably it should decline to surrender the suspect. There is no 
definitive ruling on this from either the Court of Justice or the European Court of Human 
Rights but it may be inferred from other decisions regarding fundamental rights and transfer 
of detainees.159 
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Drozd and Janousek v France and Belgium (App. 12747/87), judgment of 26 June 1992 where a previous 
 The right to be informed of the reasons for one’s arrest 
Under Article 5 (2) everyone, not just criminal suspects, has the right to be told promptly in 
simple, non-technical language that he understands the essential legal and factual reasons for 
his arrest.160 The obligation is imposed so that a person may then seek to challenge their 
detention under Article 5(4). The information need not be a detailed as that required to be 
provided to a person facing a criminal charge under Article 6(3)(a) ECHR. The requirement 
that it be provided promptly does not mean it must all be given at the moment of arrest. What 
is required depends upon the specific features of each case. Thus an interrogation a few hours 
after arrest which revealed the reasons to the detainee was held to be compliant. 161 
Sometimes the reasons may be obvious to the detainee without her needing to be told as in 
the case of a person who presented forged identity papers to the police and was arrested upon 
the discovery of the forgery.162 For detainees who do not speak the language of their place of 
arrest, interpreters must be provided promptly to enable the reasons to be given. These 
obligations now find some expression, at least in criminal cases, in Union law through the 
Directive on the Right to Information in Criminal Proceedings.163 
 
The right to test the legality of detention 
The basic right of habeas corpus is protected by Article 5(4) ECHR and this applies to all 
types of detainee, not simply criminal suspects. In principle however this is not a right to 
challenge all elements of fact and discretion supporting the detention. Rather it is the right to 
have a court review those elements that are essential to the detention being ‘lawful’.164 This is 
in contrast to the case of criminal suspects, where the court acting under Article 5(3) must be 
empowered to review whether there is sufficient evidence to give rise to a reasonable suspect 
that an offence has been committed.  For those detained following conviction by a court 
under Article 5(1)(a) the original trial usually provides adequate safeguards with respect to 
Article 5(4).165 The main importance of Article 5(4) therefore lies in cases of administrative 
detention under Articles 5(1) (b)(d) (e) and (f). In fact, the European Court of Human Rights 
has decided that in the case of mental health patients detained, the reviewing court must 
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ensure that the Winterwerp criteria (see above) are met and so its review power must be 
wider than just legality.166 The position of immigration detainees was left uncertain by the 
decision Chahal which found that the domestic court had been unable to comply with Article 
5(4) because it could not see and assess for itself the national security evidence relied upon 
by the government to support detention. This may be explained on the basis that when the 
State justifies immigration detention based upon a substantive reason, such as public security 
or absconding risk, the reviewing court should have the power to enquire into the factual 
basis for the decision and not simply conduct a review of legality.167 
The court must be independent and offer adequate procedural guarantees but it need not be 
part of the standard judicial machinery.168 The procedural requirements will vary according to 
the type of detention under challenge but equality of arms and the right to be heard are 
essential.169 An adversarial oral hearing is required in cases involving criminal suspects or 
where detention depends upon an assessment of the detainee’s dangerousness or likely 
conduct.170  Reviews must be available speedily both after the initial arrest and at reasonable 
intervals thereafter if the circumstances supporting detention vary over time. The proceedings 
must also be conducted with due diligence. In a simple case, an initial review should not have 
taken three weeks to hear, whilst in more complex cases where medical evidence must be 
gathered a longer period might be acceptable.171 Article 5 only requires automatic judicial 
review of detention in cases where a suspect is detained pursuant to criminal proceedings (see 
Article 5(1)(c) and Article 5(3)). However in Shamsa v Poland172 the Strasbourg court said in 
an immigration case, strictly obiter, that ‘detention that goes beyond several days which has 
not been ordered by a court or judge or other person authorised to exercise judicial power 
cannot be considered ‘lawful’ within the meaning of Article 5(1).’ The Court argued that this 
was implicit from a review of Article 5 and in particular Articles 5(4), 5(3) and 5(1)(c).  
 
V. Remedies 
Neither Article 6 nor other provisions of the Charter directly provide for remedies in relation 
to any breach of the right to liberty. The most obvious remedy for unlawful detention would 
be an order declaring the detention to be unlawful and ordering it to cease. Interpreting 
Article 6 in conformity with Article 5 ECHR would mean applying Article 5(4) which 
requires a court to order release in such circumstances. Beyond the remedy of release, Article 
5(5) ECHR imposes an obligation to provide everyone who has been a victim of a breach of 
Articles 5(1)-(4) with compensation.  This goes beyond the standard right to an effective 
remedy for the other Convention rights which is given by Article 13. This provision has not 
been the subject of extensive development through jurisprudence by the Strasbourg court. 
The cases suggest that where national law rules prevent compensation being awarded where a 
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breach of Article 5(1)-(4) ECHR has occurred, this amounts to a breach of Article 5(5).173 
This rejection of a virtual immunity from suit does not amount to strict liability. Indeed the 
approach taken to damages for breaches of European Union law normally requires a breach 
to be sufficiently serious.174 It is therefore an open question as to how far the Court of Justice 





The inclusion of the right to liberty in the Charter reflects its status as one of the most 
historically significant and well-established rights recognised by liberal democracies. Until 
recently however, it might have been considered of doubtful relevance to the practice of 
European Union law because its core concerns were far removed from those of EU policy-
making. This has begun to change in important ways with the expansion of Union 
competence and law-making into the areas of criminal justice and immigration. Given the 
trend towards the EU promoting cross-border co-operation between Member States in 
returning individuals to face detention, the diversity of national standards and processes will 
come under greater scrutiny. The scope of European Union law increasingly covers the 
physical restraint of convicts, suspects and immigrants with a view to their extradition to 
other Member States or expulsion from the Union. Despite this wide range of EU legislation 
that now bears upon detention of individuals, Article 6 has yet to be the subject of any 
interpretation by the Court of Justice. There remains a tension between protecting the liberty 
of individuals and promoting the Union’s policies of mutual recognition in criminal justice 
and control of the external border in asylum and immigration. Whilst the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg court is quite extensive in this field and, as interpreted by the Court of Justice,  
will have to form the basis for the protection of Article 6, the EU political institutions too 
have acknowledged that further legislation may be needed to ensure that personal liberty is 
adequately safeguarded within the Member States. The continuation of divergent prison and 
detention centre conditions, arrest and remand procedures and police conduct all pose 
obstacles to achieving that close co-operation that the Union seeks in this field. 
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